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The Informational Basis for Mass Polarization
Thomas J. Leeper∗
July 26, 2013
If nothing else, democratic politics requires compromise. Mass polarization, where citizens disagree
strongly and those disagreements magnify over time, presents obvious threats to democratic well-being. The
overwhelming presumption is that if polarization is occurring, a substantial portion of it is attributable to
fragmentation attendant an increasingly choice-laden media environment where individuals expose them-
selves only to opinion-reinforcing information. Under what conditions does mass opinion polarization occur?
Through two over-time, laboratory experiments involving information choice behavior, this paper consid-
ers, first, the effects of slant in one’s information environment on over-time opinion dynamics and, second,
the moderating role of attitude importance on those effects. The experiments reveal that, despite similar
information search behavior, those with strong attitudes are dogmatic, resisting even substantial contrary
evidence; those with weak attitudes by contrast hear opposing arguments and develop moderate opinions
regardless of the prevalence of those arguments in their environment. Evaluations of information, rather
than information search behavior per se, explain why individuals with strong attitudes polarize and those
with weak attitudes do not. Polarization therefore seems to require more than media fragmentation and, in
fact, a more important factor may be the strength of citizens’ prior attitudes on particular issues.
If nothing else, democratic politics requires compromise. Mass polarization, where citi-
zens disagree strongly and those disagreements magnify over time, therefore seems to present
obvious threats to democratic well-being. Political science has demonstrated a modulating,
though frequently uneasy, view of political polarization. This ambivalence reflects the ap-
parent divisiveness of polarized politics (Sunstein 2009) against the apparent benefits that
polarization might have for citizen decision-making (Levendusky 2010). Contemporary de-
bate surrounding polarization has deep roots. The concluding line item of the 1950 Amer-
ican Political Science Association report on political parties offered a cautious desire for
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party contrast without mass polarization.1 Just a decade later, McClosky, Hoffmann, and
O’Hara (1960) demonstrated that the two-party system offered clear differences between
parties without undesirable polarization.2 In more recent times, McClosky, Hoffmann, and
O’Hara’s assessment of American politics seems to resonate much more with the conclusion
drawn by Fiorina and Abrams (2008) that “the American public as a whole is no more polar-
ized today than it was a generation ago” (584) than with the contemporary observation by
Hetherington (2001) that “Greater ideological polarization in Congress has clarified public
perceptions of party ideology, which has produced a more partisan electorate” (629), but
the polarization literature is still growing (see, for example, Levendusky 2009, 2010, 2011;
Stroud 2011; Carmines and Ensley 2004).
The overwhelming presumption is that if polarization is occurring, a substantial portion
of that polarization is attributable to the fragmentation attendant an increasingly choice-
laden media environment where individuals can easily expose themselves only to opinion-
reinforcing information (see, especially, Sunstein 2002; Stroud 2011; Bennett and Iyengar
2008). Yet the literature says surprisingly little about when the micro foundations for mass
polarization — over-time increases in individuals’ opinion extremity3 — actually occur (but
see Taber and Lodge 2006; Feldman 2011; Levendusky 2011). Despite media choice be-
ing mentioned as a cause of polarization, that effect has withstood insufficient empirical
scrutiny. Indeed, much of the polarization literature focuses on trends in macro opinion (as
opposed to individual-level opinion changes over time). That research necessarily struggles
to demonstrate the causes of polarization because of a lack of individual-level panel data,
which is necessary to avoid faulty ecological inferences about opinion dynamics (Druckman
1“If the two parties do not develop alternative programs that can be executed, the voter’s frustration and
the mounting ambiguities of national policy might set in motion more extreme tendencies to the political
left and the political right [. . . ] Orientation of the American two-party system along the lines of meaningful
national programs is a significant step toward avoiding the development of such a cleavage” (APSA Report
1950, 14).
2“Whereas the leaders of the two parties diverge strongly, their followers differ only moderately in their
attitudes toward issues” (426).
3Fiorina and Abrams (2008) write that “Movement away from the center toward the extremes would
seem to be a noncontroversial definition of polarizing” (567).
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and Leeper 2012). Contemporary mass polarization — if it exists — has almost univer-
sally been blamed on the nature of the mass media environment (Bennett and Iyengar 2008;
Iyengar and Hahn 2009; Sunstein 2002, 2009; Stroud 2011; Arceneaux and Johnson 2012).
While it is plausible that the political information environment contributes to polarization,
the mechanisms by which this might occur are not well understood.
What political conditions and what individual predispositions push people to extremes?
Through two over-time, laboratory experiments involving information choice behavior, this
paper considers, first, the effects of slant in one’s information environment (like that thought
to cause polarization) on over-time opinion dynamics and, second, the moderating role of
attitude importance on those effects. I first describe my expectations, which are rooted in
the psychology of attitude strength, then report the design and results of each experiment
in turn, and conclude with a discussion of how information choices are made and the effects
of those choices on opinion dynamics. Experiment 1 shows how slanted environments may
influence information exposure and opinion changes, but Experiment 2 shows these effects
to be substantially moderated by the strength of individuals’ attitudes. The results suggest
that while information choices facilitate polarization for those with the strongest opinions,
slanted information environments alone are insufficient to polarize the electorate.
Information and Polarization
Recent commentary on political communication has pointed to the political information en-
vironment — the set of information available to a given individual at a given point in time
— as a central mechanism in the construction, perpetuation, and implications of polarizing
politics (see especially Sunstein 2002; Bennett and Iyengar 2008; Iyengar and Hahn 2009;
Levendusky 2010). Some have been quick to infer from increasing media choice that media
fragmentation causes average citizens to selectively expose themselves only to ideologically
congruent political information and avoid cross-cutting exposure (Bennett and Iyengar 2008;
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Iyengar and Hahn 2009).4 During the mid-century period where Schattschneider and fellow
committeemen saw parties as insufficiently differentiated, news media offered little diversity
in political information; from the perspective of political communication, this correspon-
dence is likely meaningful.5 This historical association bolsters arguments that media play
a powerful role in polarization. But does information choice alone produce polarization?
Information Choice
Research has noted that political debate is frequently competitive — posing arguments
supportive of and opposed to particular policies against one another — and that captive
exposure to competing messages seems unlikely to polarize opinions (Petty and Cacioppo
1986; Chong and Druckman 2007b). It is less clear how information choice behaviors might
enable individual-level opinion dynamics that aggregate to polarization. Despite considerable
evidence for how people choose (political) information (Redlawsk 2004; Lau and Redlawsk
2006; Fischer et al. 2005, 2011; Sundström 1987; Jonas et al. 2001; Verplanken, Hazenberg,
and Palenewen 1992; Huang 2000; Valentino et al. 2008), little research has examined how
people choose from within different information environments or how those choices affect
attitudes downstream. This seems to be, in part, due to research on political information
acquisition (see, most prominently, Lau and Redlawsk 2006) adopting and responding to
methods originated in consumer behavior research, which emphasize choice as an outcome
(Jacoby, Szybillo, and Busato-Schach 1977; Jacoby, Chestnut, and Fisher 1978), rather than
experimental designs aimed at understanding political phenomena.6
4Fiorina and Abrams (2008) find little opinion polarization during this period, but there is a good chance
this is due to the nature of the opinions considered in their assessment of opinion stability and change. As
Druckman and Leeper (2012) argue, “macro” opinion studies, like Fiorina and Abrams’s, rely fundamentally
upon less volatile, more general attitudes than those considered in most studies of opinion change and are
thus ill-suited for examining the extent to which media polarize the electorate.
5In 1980s and 1990s scholarship, “the nightly news programs of ABC, CBS and NBC were widely criticized
for being largely the same broadcasts covering the same narrow range of issues from the very same angles”
(Mutz and Young 2011, 1021; see also Bennett and Iyengar 2008; Williams and Delli Carpini 2011).
6Importantly, psychologists have also offered considerable insight into information choice behaviors
(Fischer, Schulz-Hardt, and Frey 2008; Fischer et al. 2011; Greifeneder, Scheibehenne, and Kleber 2010;
Scheibehenne, Greifeneder, and Todd 2010; Malhotra 1982).
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Choice is a critical part of the media effects, but from a political science perspective it
is probably best understood as a mechanism rather than outcome in and of itself. There
is limited extant research that considers information choice in this fashion. Arceneaux and
Johnson (2012), for example, suggest that choice undermines the polarizing effects of parti-
san media. Whereas captive exposure to Fox and MSNBC lead people to hold quite different
opinions toward issues, choice allows individuals to choose ideologically congruent informa-
tion exposure or opt out of political information altogether. Levendusky (2012), however,
finds that exposure to chosen messages magnifies the effects of partisan media observed under
captive exposure. In other research, Redlawsk, Civettini, and Emmerson (2010) show that in
the face of increasingly counter-attitudinal information about one’s preferred political can-
didate, campaign search behavior and affect toward that candidate eventually “tip” toward
the slant of the environment. Beyond these few experiments, however, we know little about
the opinion-dynamic effects of information choice, and the mixed results from Arceneaux
and Johnson (2012) and Levendusky (2012) suggest the effects of choice on polarization are
largely unresolved.7
This discussion leads to a first set of hypotheses associated with the premise that because
the information environment shapes the choices that people can make, the information en-
vironment causes the choices the people do make (and to some extent directly affects their
opinions). Just as in the real world, the information environment itself may influence atti-
tudes aside from any effects of the particular information that people choose to read. While
people make choices from the environment they are presented with, they often have little
choice over the environment itself (which is set by editorial decisions and political agendas;
Boczkowski 2010; McCombs and Shaw 1972; Baumgartner and Jones 1993). Individuals are
often incidentally exposed to the information that they choose to avoid (Lee 2009; Tewksbury,
Weaver, and Maddex 2001; Zukin and Snyder 1984). Operating within an environment that
disproportionately favors or disproportionately opposes your predispositions would therefore
7The present research expands on this extant work by examining the effects of information choices outside
the scope of cable news and the campaign simulations introduced by Lau and Redlawsk (2006).
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seem to have divergent effects on choice behavior and opinions.
Hypothesis 1: Pro-slanted environments will lead to greater numbers of Pro arti-
cles being chosen, Con-slanted environments will lead to greater numbers of Con
articles being chosen, and mixed environments will tend to lead people to choose
an even number of Pro and Con argument.
By constraining choices and by exposing individuals to a mix of Pro and Con headlines
(and further information contained within chosen articles), information environments also
change peoples’ opinions in the direction of the environment’s slant. As a result of exposure
to the environment and exposure to the information contained in articles therein, individuals
should react to that information by evaluating it and moving their opinions in the direction
of the slant of the environment, as if they were they exposed to information in a captive
fashion (Chong and Druckman 2007a; Druckman, Fein, and Leeper 2012).
Hypothesis 2: Pro-slanted environments will lead to more favorable opinions on
an issue, Con-slanted environments will lead to less favorable opinions, and mixed
environments will tend to lead to moderate opinions (comparable to those of the
control group).
Polarization for Some
If information environments sway opinions, then there is little reason to believe that polariza-
tion would happen at all. Polarization requires that individuals move to opposite extremes,
not reach the same conclusion. When is this likely to occur? When individuals select in-
formation from their environment and evaluate that information in an attitude-reinforcing
fashion (Kunda 1990; Taber and Lodge 2006), they may be much less likely to respond to
the informational contents of their environment even if that environment is stacked against
their predispositions (Sheagley 2012; Redlawsk, Civettini, and Emmerson 2010). Developing
more extreme viewpoints — the foundation of polarization — would be much more likely.
Indeed, Taber and Lodge (2006), suggest that exposure to any information increases attitude
extremity, but they consider only a balanced information environment. As Leeper (2012)
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has argued, however, attitude-defensive motivation is not always widespread; only individ-
uals with strong, personally important attitudes are likely to engage in attitude-defensive
reasoning.
This view is broadly consistent with considerable evidence that attitude importance is a
distinct psychological construct from other attitude attributes, such as accessibility (Kros-
nick 1989; Bizer and Krosnick 2001; Visser, Bizer, and Krosnick 2006) or certainty (Visser,
Krosnick, and Simmons 2003), and that attitudes become important when one’s interests
are at stake (Boninger, Krosnick, and Berent 1995). Though the motivational quality of
importance is fairly intuitive, the linkage between importance and motivated reasoning has
faced little empirical scrutiny (Eaton and Visser 2008). But the initial evidence, in experi-
ments by Leeper (2012) and Brannon, Tagler, and Eagly (2007), suggests that high attitude
importance leads individuals to prefer attitude-congruent information over incongruent in-
formation.8
I therefore expect that personally important issues and attitudes will increase the like-
lihood of attitude-congruent information seeking and directionally motivated political rea-
soning (i.e., attitude-defensive evaluations of political information). When importance is
high, motivated reasoning and its dogmatic effects are likely; when importance is low, cit-
izen responsiveness to the information environment is likely to be high. The effects of the
information environment might therefore be highly conditional — depending on the way
that individuals obtain and process information, the slant of one’s information environment
might be a central factor in the formation of one’s opinions or it might be irrelevant.
Hypothesis 3: High attitude importance will lead those with Pro t1 (pretreatment)
opinions to choose more Pro information and those with Con t1 opinions to choose
more Con information, regardless of environment.
In other words, selective exposure and evaluation may not be constrained by the con-
8Other extant evidence documents increased searching for information when an issue is personally impor-
tant (Holbrook et al. 2005; Lee et al. 1999; Hart et al. 2009; Kim 2008), but no published work documents
how the contents of the environment constrain choice behavior.
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tents of the information environment alone. An importance-driven motivation to seek out
congruent information has the potential to yield selective exposure when the environment
is evenly balanced or even when it is stacked against one’s prior opinions. Those with high
importance Pro (Con) attitudes at t1 will seek out Pro (Con) information regardless of the
environment they are in at t2. For those with low importance, however, the environment
should be much more influential in shaping the choices that people make and the opinions
they hold thereafter. This leads to two very different expectations about how those with
high and low importance attitudes, respectively, will respond to similar environments:
Hypothesis 4a: Those with high importance Pro (Con) t1 attitudes will hold sim-
ilarly positive (negative) opinions regardless of the environment they are in.
Hypothesis 4b: Those with low importance Pro and Con t1 attitudes will tend to
hold positive opinions in a Pro environment, negative opinions in a Con environ-
ment, and moderate opinions in a mixed environment (comparable to the control
group).
In other words, those most likely to engage with politics (those for whom politics or
particular issues are personally important; Krosnick 1990) are most likely to polarize, while
the remainder of the public might simply comply with the slant of the information environ-
ment. In testing these hypotheses, Study 1 examines Hypotheses 1 and 2. Study 2 serves to
replicate those findings and then tests Hypotheses 3 and 4, using a manipulation of personal
importance in order to identify clear causal effects of prior attitudes on choice behavior and
downstream opinions. While past work has examined information search behavior, it has
typically done so with an eye toward understanding choice per se (Lau and Redlawsk 2006;
Taber and Lodge 2006) rather than the effects of search on opinion dynamics (but see Druck-
man, Fein, and Leeper 2012). The critical difference between this research and extant work
(e.g., Arceneaux and Johnson 2012; Levendusky 2012) is a focus on the effects of multiple
distinct information environments and the manipulation (rather than measurement) of the
key causal variable: attitude importance. While survey-based research has made clear that
the public’s information experiences are heterogeneous, no previous experimental work has
8
Table 1: Study 1 Experimental Conditions
Search Captive
Pro 1 (35) 3 (40)
Con 2 (42) 4 (32)
Control 5 (27)
Note: Note: Numbers in parentheses are treatment group sample sizes.
been designed to accommodate this obvious reality that people face different information
environments from which they then choose what to attend to. The research presented here
therefore sets up a realistic test of whether information choice serves as a microfoundation
for polarization.
Study 1
In order to test Hypotheses 1 and 2, Study 1 looked only at the effects of slanted information
environments relative to captive exposure to Pro, Con, or non-political Control information
on information choices and the opinions that result from those choices. The findings from
Study 1 suggest that information environments can have a direct effect on opinions on two
different issues: health care reform and U.S. military actions in Libya. The Pro health care
articles focused on the benefits that health care reform would bring to those without insur-
ance and with poor access to medical care, while the Con articles focused on the expansion
of government bureaucracy. The Pro Libya articles focused on protecting civilians from vio-
lence on the part of the (then-reigning) Gaddhafi regime, while the Con articles focused on
the burden placed upon the military and costs of U.S. involvement in, then, a third overseas
conflict. All of these frames were selected for use in the study as a result of pretests con-
ducted with respondents not involved in the full study, the results of which are described in
the Online Appendix.
The study involved two manipulations. First, half of the participants were assigned to
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Figure 1: Screenshot of Example Study 1 Search Environment
“search” conditions, where they were presented with a 4x4 matrix of news article headlines
from which they could choose to read any number of articles for up to 15 minutes (the
approximate amount of time it took captive participants to read 8 articles; thus participants
were not expected to read every article). Figure 1 shows an example search environment.
Eight of these articles were non-political filler, four addressed Libya, and four addressed
health care reform. Second, participants were assigned either to a Pro condition, where all
the Libya and health care reform articles were Pro-framed, or to a Con condition, where
all the Libya and health care reform articles were Con-framed. In other words, respondents
were assigned to the same treatment condition for two simultaneous experiments: one about
Libya and one about health care reform. However, fifty-percent of the available articles did
not address either of the target issues.
Though the information environments used in both experiments are stylized — being
relatively context-free — they simulate the common experience one might have on an online
news site, where different news stories on different topics (political and non-political) are
available to read. Beyond the mundane similarity to such online news-viewing, the infor-
mation environments also mimic the broader process by which individuals choose to focus
on subsets of the stimuli in their political environment (just as the dynamic process tracing
environment [Lau and Redlawsk 2006] mimics the process of a political campaign).
The remaining respondents were assigned to “captive” conditions, where they were as-
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signed to read eight news articles. These respondents were assigned to read either 2 Pro
articles about Libya and 2 Pro articles about health care reform (along with 4 nonpolitical
filler articles) or to instead read 2 Con articles about Libya and 2 Con articles about health
care reform (along with the same nonpolitical filler). An additional control condition read
only nonpolitical articles in a captive fashion. Table 1 describes the design.
A total of 176 Northwestern University undergraduates participated in the study in Spring
2011 in order to fulfill a course requirement. Though questions are persistently raised about
the appropriateness of student participants, there is little a priori reason to believe they
should behave differently than others (Druckman and Kam 2011). Participants were not
told anything about the purpose or content of the study prior to entering the laboratory.
The study involved pretest measurement of opinions (t1) about one month before the 30-
minute, in-person experimental session. These pretreatment opinions are needed to assess
within condition variations in information choice among those supportive of and opposed
to each policy. At the lab session, individuals read articles (in either the search or captive
fashion) and then completed a short post-treatment questionnaire that measured their opin-
ions toward both issues.9 All variables are coded 0-1 with higher values indicating greater
support. Given the experimental design, all results focus on treatment group means and
statistical significance is calculated based upon nonparametric randomization/permutation
tests.
Results
Recall that Study 1 is primarily intended to test Hypothesis 1, which expects that the
contents of information environment shape search behavior, and Hypothesis 2, which expects
9The opinion question about Libya asked “To what extent do you oppose or support U.S. military action
in Libya?” and allowed respondents to indicate their opinion on a seven-point scale from “strongly oppose”
to “strongly support.” Following the lead of Druckman, Fein, and Leeper (2012), the health care question
asked respondents “Some people feel there should be a universal government insurance plan that would cover
medical and hospital expenses for all citizens. Others feel that medical and hospital expenses should be paid
by individuals and through private insurance plans. Where would you place yourself on this scale. . . ” and
allowed them to favor, on a seven-point scale, the relative balance between private and public health care
insurance. Exact question wordings are available in the Online Appendix.
11
Table 2: Health Care and Libya Opinion Changes
Condition Health care Libya
Search Pro 0.00 (0.03) 0.05 (0.04)
Captive Pro -0.05 (0.02) 0.03 (0.03)
Search Con -0.04 (0.04) -0.04 (0.03)
Captive Con -0.12 (0.04) -0.03 (0.04)
Control 0.03 (0.03) 0.06 (0.03)
Note: Note: Cell entries are treatment group means (of individual-level changes t2− t1) with standard errors
in parentheses.
that slanted environments move opinions in the direction of the slant. I first examine evidence
testing Hypothesis 2 and then relate this back to evidence of information choice behavior for
testing Hypothesis 1.
At t1 participants reported favorable opinions toward government involvement in health
care and, on average, moderate opinions toward military involvement in Libya. The first
column of Table 2 reports changes in mean health care opinions (by treatment group) between
t1 and t2. The second column does the same for the Libya issue.10 As should be clear,
exposure to Pro rather than Con messages (in either search or captive fashion) appears
to have affected opinions (with Pro participants holding more positive opinions than Con
participants), consistent with Hypothesis 2. More specifically, on the health care issue,
the difference between reading information from a slanted Pro or slanted Con information
environment is a difference in opinions of 0.04 (on a 0-1 scale, p=0.21), as opposed to a
difference of 0.07 (p=0.04) for being captively exposed to the same messages. This suggests
searching within a slanted environment can have similar effects to being captively exposed
to a biased subset of available information. The effects for Libya opinions are similar. The
difference in opinions between between those captively exposed to Pro rather than Con
information was 0.06 (p=0.02), while the difference for those searching in slanted Pro and
slanted Con environments was 0.09 (p=0.11).11 While these effects are fairly small (on
10Given that treatment conditions differed somewhat in their t1 opinions, changes rather than t2 opinions
are a better metric of treatment effects.
11Some readers may desire a discussion of how the captive conditions obtained traditional levels of statis-
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Table 3: Issue-Relevant Articles as Proportion of Total Articles Read, by Search
Condition and Prior Opinion (Study 1)
Health care Libya
t1 con t1 pro t1 con t1 pro
Search Pro 0.18 (0.03) 0.17 (0.03) 0.25 (0.04) 0.29 (0.05)
Search Con 0.15 (0.04) 0.20 (0.03) 0.26 (0.05) 0.25 (0.04)
Note: Note: Cell entries are the mean proportion of issue-relevant articles selected out of all articles read,
with standard errors in parentheses. The Pro (Con) environment contained only Pro (Con) information, so
values in the first row indicate Pro articles as a proportion of all articles read and values in the second row
indicate Con articles as a proportion of all articles read.
average about .07 on a 0-1 scale), the consistency across issues and between search and
captive conditions suggests the effects of information exposure are substantively meaningful
despite only a relatively short exposure to the framed messages.
Thus, on both issues, captive exposure to messages and search for messages within slanted
information environments appear to produce comparable effects on opinions, consistent with
predictions about opinions laid out in Hypothesis 2. This suggests that while extant research
has shown individuals to resist counter-attitudinal information in the updating of their opin-
ions, the information environment can have effects on opinion extremity. The reason for this
is clear in a simple examination of information choice behavior (which provides a test of
Hypothesis 1). Table 3 clearly shows that when faced with an environment containing only
Pro information or only Con information, individuals — regardless of t1 opinion — choose
to read approximately equal proportions of issue-relevant information, which is consistent
with the environment effects predicted by Hypothesis 1. If there is no attitude-congruent
information to choose, individuals must ultimately face incongruent information.
In sum, I find support for Hypothesis 2 — the information environment shapes opinions
by exposing individuals to potentially slanted information. I also find that individuals with
tical significance and the search conditions did not. Given recent arguments by Gelman and Stern (2006), I
hesitate to draw a distinction between the substantive meaning of “significant” and “marginally significant”
effects here. Additionally the difference-in-differences between search and captive conditions never achieve
statistical significance, offering no clear evidence that captive exposure produces larger effects than search
within a slanted environment.
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different prior opinions seem to behave in similar ways within a given information environ-
ment. Substantively, however, this leaves little room for polarization. If everyone is swayed
by the environment — in both their behavior and their opinions — choice per se would
seem to matter very little, the environment alone being the driver of opinion dynamics. In-
dividuals are constrained by the information available to them; their opinions reflect both
the perseverance of prior attitudes and their evaluations of new information. If information
choice is supposedly the basis of polarization, there must be more complicated relationships
linking the information environment, choice, and opinion change. I take up this question in
greater detail in Study 2.
Study 2
Given that Study 1 showed clear directional effects of the issue environment (i.e., environ-
ments constrained information choice behavior such that the Pro environment led to more
positive attitudes and Con environment led to more negative attitudes), Study 2 aimed to
provide a replication of those results and to further understand heterogeneity of both infor-
mation search behavior and opinion changes between those with high and low importance
attitudes (that is, to test Hypotheses 3 and 4). Recall that Hypothesis 3 predicted that
high attitude importance would lead individuals with pro t1 opinions to choose more Pro
information and those with con t1 opinions to choose more Con information, regardless of
how much attitude-congruent information was available in their environment. Hypothesis
4a expected that those with high attitude importance would therefore develop more extreme
opinions regardless of environment and Hypothesis 4b expected the opinions of those with
low attitude importance would move in the direction of the environment. To provide a rig-
orous test of these hypotheses, I largely replicate the design of Study 1 (and the findings
regarding Hypotheses 1 and 2) but gain additional leverage on the causal effects of attitude
importance by providing a direct manipulation of importance. Similar to the first experi-
14
ment, Study 2 focused on an aspect of health care reform, which I describe before turning
to the details of the experimental design.
Issue Selection and Frames
The experiment focused on opinions surrounding medical provider compensation — an aspect
of health care policy that, while important, has received dramatically less media coverage
and public debate than other facets of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(PPACA). The specifics of provider compensation are — like most areas of health care policy
— complex, but status quo policy is that most providers are paid fixed dollar amounts based
upon an itemized list of procedures or services performed regardless of how those procedures
benefit or harm patient well-being. Some argue that this current “fee-for-service” system
leads to over-utilization of health care because providers have little incentive to withhold
unnecessary care and providers benefit from performing unnecessary tests and procedures.
As one possible alternative, compensation schemes built around physician performance in
terms of patients’ health outcomes have been proposed in order to increase accountability
for services rendered and reduce overall health care spending, somewhat analogously to
proposals for performance-based pay for educators. Reforms could feasibly reduce health
care expenditures by more efficiently improving health without the excessive use of costly
tests or procedures as well as provide “integrated care” where physicians work collaboratively
to more efficiently and effectively satisfy patient needs.12 Outcome-accountable care is a
topic of ongoing policy debate spurred by portions of the PPACA, so understanding public
preferences over alternative compensation schemes is therefore a relevant contemporary issue.
And unlike more general opinions about health care policy, individuals’ opinions toward this
specific policy should not be heavily crystallized.
Articles used in the experiment were constructed from a mix of recent news coverage
and academic writing on different compensation schemes. The Pro and Con messages were
12Another alternative is to pay providers fixed salaries or fixed per-patient fees regardless of services
performed or outcomes.
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framed so as to reduce confounding due to a multitude of distinct arguments in the environ-
ment. The Pro frame focused on improvements to health care quality under outcome-based
compensation and the Con frame focused on possible reductions in health care access under
that scheme. These frames were chosen as a result of pretesting, described in the Online
Appendix.
Design
Similar to Study 1, the experiment involved two stages because it is necessary to examine
information search and attitude changes in the context of prior opinions. Basic participant
characteristics and opinions were measured during the first stage (t1) and treatments were
applied and outcomes measured during the second stage (t2) several weeks later. At t2, two
manipulations were introduced. (The design is described in Table 4.) The first provided an
exogenous manipulation of attitude importance. These manipulations follow from evidence
that attitude importance is driven in part by self-interest (Boninger, Krosnick, and Berent
1995). Though previous research has correlated attitude importance with various outcomes
(Holbrook et al. 2005, e.g.,), a manipulation provides clear causal leverage. The importance
manipulation was embedded in instructions provided to participants at the beginning of
t2.13 Importance was manipulated to be high by providing half of the participants with the
following instructions:
In today’s session, you will have the opportunity to choose to read a number of
recent news articles. Some of the articles focus on issues of clear direct personal
relevance to you, such as rules regarding how physicians are paid (which affects
your access to quality health care). Other articles focus on issues that are likely
of little direct personal relevance to you, such as issues surrounding agricultural
policy.
The other half of the participants were manipulated to believe the issue was unimportant
by instructing them that:
13Participants had been given (and were subsequently given) no other indications about the purpose of
the study.
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Figure 2: Screenshot of Example Study 2 Search Environment
In today’s session, you will have the opportunity to choose to read a number
of recent news articles. Some of the articles focus on issues of direct personal
relevance to you, such as agriculture policy (which affects prices consumers pay
for food). Other articles focus on issues of little direct personal relevance to you,
such as health regulations (which are not currently being debated and seem like
they will not significantly affect you personally). Other articles address additional
topics that have nothing to do with policymaking.
While attitude importance is often seen as a relatively fixed characteristic of attitudes,
these manipulations can been as attempting to increase (or decrease) importance directly as
well as priming (or not) participants’ existing levels of attitude importance.14 After reading
these instructions, participants were given 15 minutes to choose and read articles from an
environment that consisted of 20 articles (see Figure 2).15 As the second manipulation, the
contents of the search environments were as follows:16
– Eight articles about provider compensation:
– Pro environment contained six Pro messages and two Con articles
14Similarly, other recent research has shown that attitude importance is manipulable through the channels
described by Boninger, Krosnick, and Berent (1995), for example through the use of party cues (Druckman,
Peterson, and Slothuus 2012).
15Participants had to remain in the environment for the full 15 minutes, but could choose to stop reading
at any point.
16While the choice of the size of the search environment and proportions of different types of articles
contained therein is inevitably somewhat arbitrary, the environment was designed to be larger than what
the average participant could read in the allotted time, consist of a mix of political and non-political articles,
and not be composed disproportionately of articles addressing the target issue (only 40% of articles addressed
health care). For a similar justification of the search environment, see Druckman, Fein, and Leeper (2012).
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Table 4: Study 2 Experimental Conditions
Issue Importance
High Low
Slanted Pro 1 2
Balanced 3 4
Slanted Con 5 6
Control 7
– Con environment contained two Pro messages and six Con articles
– Mixed environment contained four Pro and four Con articles
– Control environment contained eight additional nonpolitical articles
– Four articles about other political issues (unrelated to both health care and the frames)
– Eight nonpolitical articles
Data were mostly collected in the Northwestern Political Science Research Laboratory,
involving a diverse sample of 300 participants. The sample included 109 students who com-
pleted the study for partial course credit, 96 nonstudents recruited from the campus area and
online advertisements who completed the study for a $15 cash payment, and 95 participants
recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk, who completed the study remotely and were paid
$6 each. Recruitment of each sample was planned in order to increase statistical power and
diversify the subject population lest students responded differently to the experiment than
others (Druckman and Kam 2011).17
After choosing and reading articles from the environment, participants reported their
opinions and answered a few additional questions. In order to test the robustness of effects,
two issue opinion questions were used: one that measured respondents’ preferences for fee-
for-service versus performance-based provider compensation on a seven-point scale18 and a
17Supplemental regression results, included in the Online Appendix, indicate there were no significant
differences in causal dynamics across samples.
18The exact wording asked “There is ongoing debate about how medical providers (i.e., physicians and
hospitals) should be compensated for the care they provide. Some argue that these providers should be
paid based entirely upon the services and procedures they perform. Others argue that pay should be based
entirely or at least partially on the quality of patients’ health outcomes. How do you think medical providers
should be paid?” The available responses ranged from “Pay based entirely on serviced performed” to “Pay
based entirely on health outcomes.”
18
secondary measure (asked only at t2) that captured preferences on an 11-point scale of exact
percentages of compensation that should be generated by services-based fees versus patients’
health outcomes.19 These opinion questions structure the issue of provider compensation
as degree of support for one possible move away from the status quo position of service-
based compensation rather than trying to capture support for all possible policy alternatives.
Given that both questions are intended to measure the same construct, hypotheses for both
measures are the same.20 All outcomes are scaled -1 to 1 and, as in Study 1, non-parametric
tests are used for testing all hypotheses.
Results
Though Study 2 largely serves to test Hypotheses 3 and 4, it also allows for a replication of
the results of Study 1 with regard to the direct effects of information environment on search
behavior (Hypothesis 1) and opinion dynamics (Hypothesis 2). Consistent with the results
in Study 1, the Pro environment made individuals more supportive over time relative to
the control group and the Con environment made individuals less supportive relative to the
control group. These results are consistent with the direct effect of the environment outlined
in Hypothesis 2. Averaging across all conditions, opinions became significantly more negative
between t1 and t2 (x¯=-0.31, SE=0.07), but these changes were uneven across treatment
groups.21 Given the overall negative change in opinions, results will be presented hereafter as
difference-in-differences estimates. Specifically, the control group change in opinion (t2− t1)
19The question asked “In your view, what percentage of medical provider compensation should be based on
services performed and what percentage should be based on their patients’ health outcomes?” The responses
were on a scale from “100% based on services performed and 0% based on health outcomes” and “0% based
on services performed and 100% based on health outcomes,” with each option summing to 100%. Exact
question wording is available in the Online Appendix.
20A pretest of the dependent measures was conducted with twenty-one of the participants from the frame-
selection pretest, described in the Online Appendix. On the original variable scales, these respondents
reported a mean opinion of 4.71 (SD = 1.55) on the ordinal measure and a mean of 62.86% (SD = 21.94)
on the percentage measure, both of which indicate a slight preference for service-based compensation. The
two measures correlated at r = .86, suggesting they likely measure the same attitude construct.
21Treatment group sample sizes, as well as means for t1 opinion, t2 opinion, the change over time, and the
secondary t2 opinion measure are reported in the Appendix.
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is subtracted from every other treatment conditions’ mean change in opinion (t2 − t1).22
Breaking out results by t1 opinion, interesting patterns of effects emerge that allow us to
examine Hypotheses 3 (that t1 opinions shape information choices) and 4 (that t1 opinions
and attitude importance shape over-time opinion changes). In regards to opinion changes,
significant differences across treatment conditions emerge when looking at both t1 opponents
(those with con t1 opinions; Kruskal-Wallis χ2(6)=10.62, p=0.10) and t1 supporters (those
with pro t1 opinions; χ2(6)=26.83, p=0.00).23 The same pattern emerges for the salary mea-
sure, which was asked only at t2 (opponents: χ2(6)=16.93, p=0.00; supporters: χ2(6)=29.30,
p=0.00).24
To clarify the pattern of effects, Figure 3 shows the changes in opinions over time in
each treatment condition (relative to the control group as discussed above), separated by
opponents (gray bars) and supporters (black bars). Looking at the Pro environment condi-
tions (left set of four bars), opponents who were induced to have high-importance attitudes
actually became more negative over-time, while supporters became more favorable toward
outcome-based compensation. The plot clearly shows that the effect of the environment
on polarization is highly conditional — the environment alone seems to matter less than
how different types of individuals behave within that environment. The high-importance
respondents engaged in motivated evaluation of the available information, polarizing in their
responses to the same Pro information (consistent with Hypothesis 4a). Under low impor-
tance, however, opinions among those with low importance moved in a fashion very similar
to the no-information control group, which was unexpected (by Hypothesis 4b).
A similar pattern emerges in the Mixed conditions (middle set of bars). High importance
22This has no effect on inference, but eases interpretation by having a change of zero within a treatment
group signify no change relative to the control group (which received no issue-relevant information at any
time during the experiment). When results are presented for individuals with con t1 (pro t1) opinions,
the control group average for only those participants with con t1 (pro t1) opinions is used in making this
calculation. Regression results, available in the Online Appendix, show that inference is substantively similar
if either t2 opinion or t2− t1 opinion change are regressed on treatment condition.
23The Kruskal-Wallis χ2 is a nonparametric analogue to ANOVA that does not require a Normality
assumption.
24Looking just at t2 opinions, significant differences across treatment conditions are also present (con:
χ2(6)=21.60, p=0.00; pro: χ2(6)=39.07, p=0.00).
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Figure 3: Opinion Changes
High Pro Low Pro High Mixed Low Mixed High Con Low Con
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
Note: Figure displays difference-in-differences estimates (and associated standard errors) of treatment effects,
separated by opponents (gray) or supporters (black), less the mean change in control group opinion. Reading
left-to-right, statistics displayed are: -0.23 (0.07), 0.44 (0.16), 0.07 (0.13), -0.04 (0.09); -0.17 (0.10), 0.38
(0.08), 0.14 (0.08), -0.18 (0.13); -0.14 (0.10), -0.27 (0.15), -0.05 (0.11), -0.43 (0.11).
respondents again polarized in response to the even balance of Pro and Con information
available to them, while low importance respondents moderated (Con respondents becoming
more supportive and Pro respondents becoming less supportive).
The results for the Con conditions (right set of bars) are somewhat different. High im-
portance respondents, regardless of t1 opinion became slightly less supportive (reflecting the
information in their environment). Low importance opponents moved very little (consis-
tent with behavior in the other information environments), but low importance supporters
became significantly — indeed, dramatically — less supportive.25 This change was not ex-
pected but may reflect the slightly right-skewed t1 opinion distribution: there were very few
individuals offerings scores of 6 or 7 (i.e., very supportive of outcome-based compensation),
suggesting that on this particular issue individuals held relatively moderate and possibly
ambivalent opinions that, lacking importance, were easily swayed by con information. This
also bolsters the evidence opponents: regardless of environment, those with high-importance
con t1 opinions become consistently (indeed indistinguishably) more opposed after reading
quite different mixes of information in each of the three environments.
25While this movement in the direction of the environment was expected by Hypothesis 4b, it runs contrary
ot the pattern of opinion moderation in the other low importance conditions.
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Figure 4: Balance of Pro and Con Articles Read
High Pro Low Pro High Mixed Low Mixed High Con Low Con
−0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
Note: Figures displays the mean difference in proportions (and associated standard error) of Pro and Con
articles read (Pro%-Con% of all articles read) for each treatment condition, separated by opponents (gray)
and supporters (black). Statistics displayed are: 0.33 (0.05), 0.31 (0.09), 0.28 (0.06), 0.30 (0.07), 0.15 (0.04),
0.11 (0.04), 0.05 (0.06), 0.00 (0.05), -0.10 (0.04), -0.04 (0.02), -0.09 (0.03), 0.03 (0.02).
The size of these effects are also quite large. Searching for information when an issue is
personally important has the potential to move opinion a substantial amount. By far the
largest effect is among supporters in the high importance Pro environment, who on average
moved 22% of the way up the opinion scale. This is particularly interesting because their
comparable peers who were identical except for having been primed to have low attitude
importance appear to have not changed their attitudes at all in response to the exact same
information environment. Furthermore, despite subtle variations across the Pro, Mixed, and
Con environments, one striking feature of Figure 3 is the similarity of the effects of prior
attitudes and strength across the three environments. If the environment alone explained
opinion dynamics, we would expect the left, center, and right portions of the figure to look
quite different. Instead, they look fairly similar, which provides visual evidence that attitude
importance is critical for understanding how choice might lead to polarization.
These results suggest two possible explanations for why opinions moved the way they
did: either people engage in attitude-congruent selective exposure and/or evaluate whatever
information they encounter in an attitude-reinforcing fashion. As a reminder, Hypothe-
sis 3 expected that those with high importance attitudes would choose disproportionately
attitude-congruent information. Overall, individuals read 8.59 (SE=0.20) articles during
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their fifteen minutes in the search environment, or just about one article every two minutes.
And, attitude importance — despite the expectation that it would increase information-
seeking — appears to have had little effect on behavior (contrary to Hypothesis 3). Indeed,
it had no effect on the balance of Pro and Con articles read across the conditions. Figure 4
shows this pattern of search behavior. Individuals in Pro environments read more Pro than
Con articles, those in Mixed environments read more Pro than Con (though the balance
between the two was closer), and those in Con environments read about the same number
of Pro and Con articles (with opponents reading more Con articles).
The lack of differences in search behavior between those high- and low-importance at-
titudes and t1 attitudes means that the patterns of opinion polarization (among high im-
portance individuals) and opinion moderation (among low importance individuals) is due
to biases in evaluation not biases in search behavior. And the behavioral results in Study
2 perfectly replicate those of Study 1. While the effects on opinions were dramatic despite
few differences in participants’ search behavior, effects on individuals’ certainty about their
opinions provide further evidence of motivated reasoning. In aggregate, the sample showed
no significant over-time changes in attitude certainty during the course of the experiment
(x¯=-0.02, SE=0.02). But changes in certainty over time differed dramatically among those
with high and low importance attitudes. Those manipulated to have high importance became
significantly more certain about their opinions (x¯=0.28, SE=0.03) even as they reached op-
posite opinions from the same information, while those manipulated to have low importance
became significantly less certain about their more moderate opinions (x¯=-0.15, SE=0.03)
and this difference is clearly significant (p=0.00). Interestingly, when manipulated to have
high importance, changes in certainty did not differ between opponents and supporters (see
Figure 5). By contrast, under low importance, opponents became much less certain of their
opinions and supporters showed little change in certainty regardless of environment.
These results, consistent with motivated evaluation of information, are interesting be-
cause those with high importance responded to any issue-relevant information, regardless of
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Figure 5: Changes in Attitude Certainty
High Pro Low Pro High Mixed Low Mixed High Con Low Con
−0.5
0.0
0.5
Note: Figures displays difference-in-differences estimates of treatment effects (and associated standard er-
rors): i.e., changes in attitude certainty from t1 to t2 within each treatment condition, separated by opponents
(gray) and supporters (black), less the mean change in control group certainty. Statistics displayed are: 0.31
(0.05), 0.48 (0.10), -0.33 (0.12), -0.04 (0.09); 0.22 (0.08), 0.25 (0.06), -0.24 (0.09), 0.00 (0.08); and 0.18 (0.11),
0.22 (0.07), -0.23 (0.07), 0.01 (0.09).
its valence, by becoming more certain of their increasingly extreme opinions. When their
opinions were unimportant, however, more information led them to be less convinced, even
though their opinions did not move much over time.
Discussion
The late 20th and early 21st centuries have been marked by their abundance of choice —
people seem freer to make choices than ever before. For many years, this opportunity for
choice was seen as a positive shift away from the homogeneous offerings of mid-century
political media (Mutz and Young 2011). Yet Botti and Iyengar (2006) write that “the
presumption that people are never worse off, and usually better off, as a result of making
their own choices may not necessarily be true” (35). The results presented here suggest
that information choice, at least among those with personally important opinions, does not
appear to make those individuals or democracy better off. Freedom to choose one’s political
news seemed to many scholars of the 1980s a much needed component of democratic health,
but the abundance of choice that has emerged in the “post-broadcast” present is now being
seen as democratically problematic (Sunstein 2002). Whereas citizens are no longer captive
to media influence, they must make choices from a complex information environment.
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Empirically testing the impacts of information choice depends in large part upon two
underutilized features of experimental design that were used to advantage in this research:
panel data and moves away from the “captive audience” assumption (Hovland 1959; Druck-
man, Fein, and Leeper 2012). Mass polarization is fundamentally a question of over-time
dynamics of individuals’ opinions, aggregated at multiple points in time. Panel data is the
only way to establish the existence of polarization and begin to understand its causes and
effects.26 A lack of studies involving actual information choice is even more problematic.
Typically, when experiments have incorporated information choice, the set of alternatives
has typically been small, such as Fox and MSNBC (Levendusky 2011; Arceneaux and John-
son 2011), pro and con (Gaines and Kuklinski 2011; Leeper 2012), etc. Studying choices
among a few alternatives or among only political alternatives is informative, but may say
little about how individuals make and respond to choices from more realistic environments.
Mass polarization and its downstream effects on democratic health are too important to be
examined only with old tools — the experimental designs presented here have used innovative
techniques to offer novel evidence about this vitally important topic.
The research presented here corrects these deficits of empirical investigation and expands
the existing extant work by looking at a broader set of information alternatives to choose
from and by carefully manipulating a key causal variable — attitude importance — that
has been ignored in past work. Study 1 showed that highly biased environments can shape
opinions in aggregate, but raised questions about why opinions moved the way they did.
Study 2 revealed that it may be quite unimportant how much information people have
about an issue or what that information says. Instead, opinion dynamics depend much more
on evaluations of information in one’s environment, which seem to be largely determined
by one’s prior attitudes. Attitude strength biased evaluations of information, regardless of
26Yet panels can also reveal limitations of findings — a third panel wave for Study 1 reveals that the
opinion-changing effects of information choice may be short-lived. A figure, included in the Online Appendix
shows that opinions largely returned to their pre-test positions by approximately one week after the search
environment session, which is consistent with other evidence on the durability of framing effects (Lecheler and
de Vreese 2011). Of course, these results do not necessarily reflect the ongoing process by which individuals
repeatedly search for information (in a potentially biased fashion).
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participants’ environments or their actual information search behavior.
These results further suggest that caution should be used when extrapolating from evi-
dence of selective exposure to information (e.g., Stroud 2011; Garrett, Carnahan, and Lynch
2011) to polarizing effects of those choices. Demonstration only of selective exposure27 does
little to substantiate the existence or causes of opinion changes because the strength of the
public’s opinions appears to affect polarization far more than the information they choose
or happen to receive. Intriguingly, the experiments presented here suggest that while the
contents of the distinct environments shaped what information people chose, those with
different prior opinions chose remarkably similar information. How people evaluate informa-
tion is most critical for understanding these dynamics; what information individuals actually
choose seems rather less important. Attitude strength and its effects on information pro-
cessing seem to lay at the core of mass polarization, while the contents of the information
environment and the choices people make matter far less.
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Appendix. Study 2 Opinion Data
Condition (n) t1 t2 t2-t1 t2 (salary %)
High Pro (46) 3.65 (0.20) 3.52 (0.20) -0.13 (0.20) 5.22 (0.20)
Low Pro (37) 3.66 (0.19) 3.46 (0.19) -0.20 (0.19) 4.43 (0.19)
High Mixed (49) 3.53 (0.21) 3.59 (0.21) 0.06 (0.21) 4.22 (0.21)
Low Mixed (36) 3.81 (0.20) 3.39 (0.20) -0.42 (0.20) 4.28 (0.20)
High Con (46) 3.72 (0.21) 3.07 (0.21) -0.65 (0.21) 3.85 (0.21)
Low Con (49) 3.57 (0.20) 2.98 (0.20) -0.59 (0.20) 2.88 (0.20)
Control (37) 3.70 (0.25) 3.46 (0.25) -0.24 (0.25) 3.73 (0.25)
Note: Cell entries are treatment group means, with standard errors in parentheses, on the original variable
scales (7-points for the the first three columns and 11-points for the last column).
31
